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Public policies rarely have single objectives. For the federal Empowerment Zones
and Enterprise Communities initiative, bettering the socioeconomic opportunity
structure among a collection of the nation 's low-income areas is only one of its
goals. Another initiative objective is to foster the representation of common citi-
zens, especially residents, in the planning and implementation of strategies and
programs designed to redevelop these low-income areas. Strategic community
planning was the method chosen by the initiative's designers to achieve both ob-
jectives. This article, which makes use of the case study approach, addresses stra-
tegic community planning as an instrument of advancing citizen representation in
urban redevelopment processes. Specifically, it describes and critiques the process
jointly administered in three upstate New York cities — Albany, Schenectady, and
Troy — that are participating in the urban portion of the federal initiative. The
purpose of this study is to assess the degree to which residents of the low-income
areas of these three cities participated in the strategic community planning pro-
cess.
Residents who participate directly in the process of urban redevelopment planning
have the opportunity to acquire expertise in the subject matter, patience to see
projects through from problem definition to implementation, and new skills, for ex-
ample, idea formulation, deliberation, negotiation, and consensus building, along with a
sense of political efficacy. 1 Moreover, citizen engagement in urban redevelopment, both
at the planning and policy implementation levels, holds out a possibility for "the devel-
opment of responsible social and political action on the part of the individual,"2 which
democratic theorists like Carole Pateman and Jane Mansbridge envision as the end
product of political participation and the central aim of democratic societies.3 Conse-
quently, urbanists of all types, for example, planners, philosophers, and political scien-
tists, assert that urban redevelopment should be democratized, namely, that citizen
participation in urban decision making should be increased and widespread.4 Scholars,
however, are not alone in calling for greater citizen participation; governments have
also made this assertion. Consider the example of the Clinton administration5 and the
implementation of the urban Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities initia-
tive by its Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).6
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In the early stages of the initiative, which is a reincarnation of earlier federal poli-
cies targeting grants and tax incentives to low-income urban neighborhoods,7 strategic
planning was relied upon to provide for and encourage citizen participation in the
redevelopment decisions for low-income neighborhoods nominated by their cities to
receive federal reinvestment funds from HUD under the initiative. 8 In the hands of
common citizens, strategic planning is a tool for identifying community problems and
priorities; scanning their community's weaknesses and strengths vis-a-vis those of
other communities; formulating plans aimed at minimizing the disadvantages of their
communities and exploiting their strengths in relation to new opportunities; and target-
ing community resources more efficiently and effectively.
HUD required prospective applicant cities to administer strategic community plan-
ning processes that were bottom-up driven and open to all who had stakes in the future
of the targeted communities.9 As Marilyn Gittell notes, "The Clinton Administration
invited — indeed encouraged — communities, including community organizations as
well as rank-and-file citizens, to pull together in drafting blueprints for future eco-
nomic growth and urban development." 10 A cross section of affected groups — com-
munity residents, social and religious organizations, representatives from the private
and nonprofit sectors, and local governments — were to be involved. However, of the
ordinary citizens who were expected to participate in the planning process, no group
was considered more important than the residents of the low-income communities that
would eventually be targeted for federal funding: it was expected that they would be
full partners in the process.
11 This notion was mortgaged to a belief that the representa-
tives from low-income neighborhoods should be, would want to be, and are capable of
being active participants in the redevelopment of their communities.
An evaluation of the Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities initiative
showed that, among the sample of eighteen cities selected for study, most of the strate-
gic community plans submitted to HUD were initiated and designed through processes
that included cross sections of citizens. 12 This study of participation and governance in
the planning phase concluded that "the citizen participation that occurred during the
development of strategic [community] plans was significantly and substantively
greater than that which [took] place under previous federal urban initiatives." 13 How-
ever, "because community involvement is solicited," notes Gerry Riposa, "it does not
necessarily follow that . . . [political elites] will divide authority and decision-making
powers with those whose input is sought." 14
Despite the finding of "significant and substantive" citizen participation, some stra-
tegic community plans submitted to HUD were formulated with very little, and some-
times without any, citizen involvement. In an undetermined number of cases, the
Clinton administration's call for citizen participation and community empowerment
went unheard. In some instances, as John Gaventa and his colleagues found, "regional
development districts or industrial boards led the effort to draft [strategic community
plans]. Because some institutions had tittle experience with bottom-up planning, strat-
egies that they devised largely flowed from the top down." 15 As a result, "participation
of community groups was only an afterthought; for the most part, professional bureau-
crats and politicians shaped [their] city's plan." 16 Absent high levels of government
involvement, private-sector elites from both the non- and for-profit realms assumed
responsibility for and control of their city's strategic community planning process. 17
While a wide range of groups may have been present "around the table," those
involved in designing and setting the agendas that created the plans for their cities
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were "the same old players who had always managed planning and development [in
their cities]" — government, philanthropic, and economic elites. 18
Looking through the lens of citizen participation and participatory planning litera-
ture, this study evaluates HUD's use of strategic community planning in its Empower-
ment Zones and Enterprise Communities initiative. It describes and critiques the strate-
gic community planning process that took place in one of the nation's sixty-five urban
enterprise communities, namely, Albany-Schenectady-Troy. 19 The survey centers on the
case study approach to detail the strategic community planning process that took place
among the poorest sections of these three cities prior to their joint submission of an
application to HUD for designation as an enterprise community. It (1) identifies the
actor(s) who initiated and guided the strategic community planning process that was
administered; (2) describes the level of resident participation throughout the strategic
community planning process; and (3) outlines how such planning for federal urban
neighborhood redevelopment initiatives can be enhanced to promote greater citizen
participation in the future.
The Urban Enterprise Community Program
According to HUD secretary Andrew Cuomo, the urban Empowerment Zones and En-
terprise Communities initiative is the Clinton administration's opportunity "to prove to
the nation that we do know how to revitalize devastated areas."20 Functioning as the
nation's urban policy, the initiative targets low-income urban neighborhoods for concen-
trated and coordinated federal resources; coordinates redevelopment and revitalization
efforts among both the public and private sectors; promotes long-range strategic com-
munity planning as a vehicle for citizen participation and community empowerment;
and promotes holistic redevelopment strategies that combine physical, social, and eco-
nomic revitalization activities.21 The Clinton administration hopes that HUD's imple-
mentation of the initiative, which incorporates federal funds with regulatory relief,
technical assistance, and the participation of stakeholders — residents, business owners,
service providers, and governments — will yield inner-city low-income communities
that provide security, community, and opportunity to their residents. 22
The initiative is comprised of two components — the Empowerment Zones program
and the Enterprise Communities program. The former targets $815 million in flexible
grants and $900 million in federal tax credits among a few central cities;23 the latter
targets far less money at a far greater number of small to medium-size cities. 24 Of the
two, the Empowerment Zones portion has received the bulk of the academic
community's attention. 25 The Enterprise Communities program,26 however, while not as
well funded or administered in the nation's largest cities, cannot be overlooked: Over
the next ten years it will aim an estimated $195 million in Title XX Social Services
Block Grants and $195 million in federal tax credits at improving the economies and
social environments among a number of U.S. urban low-income communities. 27
Cities in this program, as well as those in the Empowerment Zones program, were
chosen by HUD on the basis of their submission of strategic community plans that (1)
identified specific geographic areas that met the initiative's criteria for socioeconomic
distress;
28
(2) detailed how the economic, physical, and human capital among the resi-
dents of the identified impoverished communities would be increased; and (3) noted the
degree to which state, local, and private resources would be made available for redevel-
oping these communities. Taken as a whole, a city's strategic community plan had to
address the creation of economic opportunities and sustainable community development
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in its low-income neighborhoods by identifying strategies that could effectively lower
the barriers to employment faced by the residents of their city's low-income communi-
ties and rebuild the physical and social environments of such places. But that was not
all.
Developing strategies for bettering the socioeconomic opportunity structure in the
nation's low-income areas was only one requirement for cities applying to the urban
Enterprise Communities program. For another, the cities had to foster the participation
of ordinary citizens, especially residents, in planning and implementing strategies for
redeveloping their low-income areas. This participation, according to the Clinton
administration's written record and the rules and regulations for the Empowerment
Zones and Enterprise Communities initiative, was to be direct and have the effect of
empowering average citizens.29 As a consequence, applicant cities had to describe the
extent to which rank-and-file citizens, especially residents of target communities, par-
ticipated in the strategic community planning process, along with their anticipated roles
in the post-designation process. 30
Empowerment through Participation: A Note on Praxis
Susan Fainstein and Clifford Hirst discern a strong belief that "participation in urban
politics and community life [is] a potentially transformative experience."31 Those favor-
ing citizen participation, especially among residents, in the public decision-making
processes surrounding urban planning and redevelopment consider collaboration itself
to be educative and socially transformative: participation fosters the development of
"public regardedness" and a concern for collective interests over individual interests. 32
But beyond serving as a means of fostering public regardedness and collectivism, citi-
zen participation in urban redevelopment is promoted as an instrument of empower-
ment, notably among the residents of low-income urban neighborhoods. 33
Empowerment is centered around the axiom that the inclusion and ongoing involve-
ment of residents in the formulation and implementation of community-based agendas
are essential to the sustained revitalization of low-income communities. 34 As Robyne
Turner informs us, empowerment "is more than agenda access; it is the ability to
change direction and be responsible for making it happen. ... It addresses the question
of who defines the process rules and ultimately the agenda."35 In their study of neigh-
borhood participation in five U.S. cities, Jeffrey Berry, Kent Portney, and Ken Thomson
conclude that it "may not transform people to the degree that participation theorists
have anticipated, but it does make a difference in the attitudes of people who become
involved in such political activities"; resident empowerment can come from participa-
tion in public decision-making processes. 36 Through education and encouragement by
governments and philanthropies, residents can play a direct role in and influence, if not
control and determine, the course of their communities. 37
"Making the case for [participation and empowerment] on theoretical grounds is
much easier," caution Berry et al., "than demonstrating that it will work."38 But theory
is being put into practice and yielding the expected results. Around the United States,
low-income communities are being reconverted to stable places of residence through
the organization and mobilization of their occupants, coupled with external funding
from not-for-profit and public institutions.39 In these situations, residents are often the
primary instruments for reversing the downward trajectory of their neighborhoods.
Boston's Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI), for example, demonstrates
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empirically that participation and empowerment are not only possible but fundamental
to the redevelopment of low-income localities. 40
In the Dudley Street neighborhood, incorporation and involvement not only encour-
aged the leadership of residents in addressing community issues but increased their
political efficacy, which was necessary to the success of resident-controlled community
redevelopment.41 The DSNI illustrates that in choosing action over resignation (accept-
ing neighborhood conditions as unalterable) and exit (flight from a neighborhood),
citizens can be effective at community problem solving. 42 Although resignation and exit
remain viable options for them, the residents of such neighborhoods can also choose to
engage in day-to-day, grassroots, community-based activities intended to reverse spiral-
ing socioeconomic conditions in their surroundings.43 Examples of these activities in-
clude neighborhood crime watches, incumbent upgrading, community gardens, forma-
tion of neighborhood associations, and chartering community development corpora-
tions.
Albany, Schenectady, and Troy in a Regional Context
As in other northeastern U.S. cities, economic restructuring has had a profound effect
on Albany, Schenectady, and Troy, which, 150 miles north of the Bronx, are in New
York State's Capital Region.44 For example, over the last quarter of a century, manufac-
turing jobs in and around these three cities have decreased by more than 40 percent 45
while technology and advanced service industry employment has increased. Between
1973 and 1995, manufacturing employment in the region dropped from 19 percent to 9
percent, while service employment increased to 36 percent, up from 25 percent.46
Besides experiencing alterations in the private-sector employment structure of their
economies, public-sector employment, which has been central to the three cities and
their economies, especially Albany's, is declining.47 By century's end, the public sector
is expected to have contracted by 10 percent.48 If predictions prove true, government
employment will account for fewer than 20 percent of the region's jobs, down from the
current 30 percent.49 The restructuring of employment opportunities in the public sector,
particularly at the state government level, is expected to have "major direct and indirect
impacts for the long term stability of the region's economy," for instance, retail vacan-
cies, declining home ownership and housing values, and decreased local revenues, espe-
cially in Albany, Schenectady, and Troy. 50
In addition to transformed economies, the region's urban housing markets have un-
dergone noticeable changes; a majority of the region's population has shifted from its
cities to its suburbs. In 1970, 53 percent of this population resided in the three cities. 51
Twenty years later, less than half (44 percent) of this population resided in one of the
three.
52 Coupled to the region's increased suburbanization of population and housing is
the increased suburbanization of commercial activity and employment. In 1972, Albany,
Schenectady, and Troy accounted for 63 percent of the region's retail sales, but by 1990
the figure was less than 50 percent.53 Windshield tours of the three cities reveal that
commercial vacancies have increased; in some sections, whole commercial blocks have
been abandoned. Buildings in which large retailers like Woolworth once prospered are
empty; they are too large and too expensive for most local entrepreneurs.
The migration of human, financial, and social capital to the suburban peripheries of
the region's three urban centers has depressed the socioeconomic conditions of the inner
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cities. Social distress, as measured by indicators such as poverty and physical deteriora-
tion, have risen.54 In Albany, for example, the poverty rate has grown and the number of
people on public assistance has doubled.55 This downward mobility has occurred despite
the fact that the city's residents have experienced an overall increase in their median
household incomes. 56 Moreover, in the poorest communities of the three cities —
Albany's South End, Arbor Hill, and West Hill neighborhoods, Schenectady's Hamilton
Hill neighborhood, and Troy's North Central neighborhood — representatives of neigh-
borhood-based and grassroots community development organizations assert that munici-
pal services, the quality and quantity of housing, and the public infrastructure of roads,
parks, and sewers are all in decline. 57 Unemployment and poverty, along with other
measures of socioeconomic distress, are believed to be higher in these communities
relative to their cities and the region.
There is no statistical proof to support the claims made by community organizations
regarding municipal malfeasance. But there is evidence that the social environments of
the cities' poorest neighborhoods differ markedly from the rest of the Capital Region.
While unemployment stood at 10 percent in the poorest urban neighborhoods of Al-
bany, Schenectady, and Troy at the start of the decade, the rate for the region was 5
percent.58 In terms of poverty, 33 percent of families residing in the cities' low-income
neighborhoods were in poverty in 1990, compared with 9 percent of famities throughout
the region. 59 As for the proportion of households on public assistance, 19 percent of
those in the region's poor urban communities received public assistance compared with
5 percent for the region.60 Finally, 67 percent of adults residing in the cities' low-income
neighborhoods were high school graduates, compared with 87 percent for the region as
a whole.61
These statistics show clearly that the low-income neighborhoods of Albany,
Schenectady, and Troy would be nominated to participate in the urban Enterprise Com-
munities program. They typify the districts the Clinton administration's Empowerment
Zones and Enterprise Communities initiative intended to target. As one mayor wrote to
HUD, 'The neighborhoods that would benefit the most from [the Enterprise Communi-
ties program] are overwhelmed by the more complex and life-threatening burdens of the
drug war and the associated social ills of unemployment, teenage pregnancy, and sub-
stance abuse."62
Planning for the Albany-Schenectady-Troy Enterprise Community
HUD issued criteria for the selection of city-nominated communities to participate in
the Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities initiative in January 1994.63
Applicant cities were given six months to organize residents; involve representatives
from both the public and private sectors; formulate strategic plans for their communities
and submit them to HUD. Applicant cities were required to form strategic community
planning committees comprised of a cross section of people broadly representing the
racial, cultural, and economic diversity of the neighborhood. HUD mandated that com-
mittees include all stakeholders: residents of target areas, along with officials from
municipal and state government and representatives of the private for- and not-for-profit
sectors had to be chosen as members. 64
Generally, local governments were the catalysts for the strategic community plan-
ning process in the cities that applied for federal funding under the initiative.65 Mayors
or city managers usually initiated their cities' application.66 But the mayors of Albany,
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Schenectady, and Troy initially chose not to apply to the program despite the fact that
an Enterprise Community designation would provide S2 million in federal-state funding
to each municipality. 67 The catalyst for the initiation, development, and submission of
the Albany-Schenectady-Troy Enterprise Community application was a nongovernmen-
tal institution established and funded by the 300 largest private for-profit corporations
in the Capital Region, the Center for Economic Growth (CEG). This group formulated
the proposal for a joint-municipality application; convinced the mayors to pursue an
Enterprise Community designation; raised funds to arrange for the strategic community
planning process; served as the liaison between the three cities, New York State, and
HUD; and selected the membership of the strategic community planning committee.68
The Centerfor Economic Growth
Prior to HUD's inviting applications for the urban Enterprise Communities program,
projects involving the redevelopment of the region's poorest urban communities, espe-
cially those with large African-American and Latino populations, were absent from the
activities of the Center for Economic Growth. In line with the perspective of Paul
Peterson on urban economic development, CEG adheres to the notion that urban policy
alternatives are limited by cities' having to be economically competitive. 69 Emphasizing
the commercial intensification of land use and economic growth, CEG seeks to expand
commercial opportunities for established companies, attract new firms to the region,
and provide services to firms that either relocate to the region or are starting up. 70 It
attempts to increase its ability to accomplish such goals by advocating for public poli-
cies assumed to increase the region's competitive advantage in relation to its economic
position, political influence, and social prestige, namely, tax abatements, wage credits,
and low taxes, which are common government inducements to entice investors, produc-
ers, and consumers to relocate from other areas. 71
CEG's interest in the low-income neighborhoods of Albany, Schenectady, and Troy
was fostered by the urban Enterprise Community program's emphasis on economic
opportunity, especially job creation and entrepreneurship, rather than on social ser-
vices.
72 Because the program was not redistributive in terms of policy, CEG's involve-
ment would not gainsay its growth-oriented agenda. (It is plausible that had the applica-
tion for the program required a financial commitment from the private and local public
sectors, CEG would probably not have initiated the pursuit of an Enterprise Community
designation for the three cities. Residents and activists from the target neighborhoods,
however, contend that the motivation behind CEG's involvement was a public relations
campaign aimed at providing its membership with the appearance of being responsible
corporate citizens.)73
Moreover, since the program called for collaboration and cooperation between the
public and private sectors, CEG, which has promoted public-private partnerships since
its inception, viewed it as an opportunity to advance the interests of the region. 74 It was
in the spirit of creating a regional private-public partnership that the Center for Eco-
nomic Growth involved itself with the Enterprise Community program: "By working
with [Albany, Schenectady, and Troy] to coordinate the application, CEG [played] the
role of honest broker in an effort which could result in additional federal assistance for
a vast array of economic development and job creation efforts in the region."75
Following HUD's issuance of the Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities
initiative's criteria, CEG spent three months promoting the joint application of Albany,
Schenectady, and Troy to the urban Enterprise Community program. In its meetings
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with the mayors of the three cities, CEG proposed to cosubmit to HUD an application
that focused on regional collaboration and cooperation among the for-profit, nonprofit,
and public sectors. Such an application, influenced by the scholarship which contends
that regions, not cities or states, are increasingly the central social and economic units
of society, might prove to be novel compared with others received by HUD.76 Beyond
its originality, regionalization made sense in the context of the Capital Region and the
relationship among its three cities: "No community in the region [was] economically
self-sufficient, nor will they be. . . . The region already functions as a region, not as a
collection of self-sufficient municipalities."77 A region-based strategic community plan
would allow the municipalities to deal together with problems like poverty, unemploy-
ment, and crime, something that had never happened in the region. Should an Enter-
prise Community designation be awarded, a regional plan for the cities' low-income
communities would, in the words of one mayor, "allow for a sharing of successful pro-
grams [that] will greatly enhance the efforts to improve distressed neighborhoods in all
three communities."78 Collaboration would allow the cities to coordinate their policies
and programs and share in a new pool of resources that might allow them to be effective
at turning around their poor neighborhoods.79
There were, however, more practical reasons for CEG's regional approach. If the
cities applied to the Enterprise Community program individually, each would probably
be rejected. Although each city had low-income areas, no single city could identify
enough of them to meet HUD's criterion of socioeconomic distress. In addition, should
an Enterprise Community designation be awarded to the three cities, the moneys that
accompanied the designation could be used to enhance the background conditions that
are believed to influence decisions regarding business relocation, for example, imple-
menting human resource policies that foster and sustain a skilled workforce. 80 Finally,
because HUD did not require a financial commitment, the cost of applying for an Enter-
prise Community designation was low. 81
The Albany-Schenectady-Troy Committee
With the consent of the mayors of the three cities, along with $30,000 in public funds
— $10,000 in discretionary funding from each municipality — CEG established the
Albany-Schenectady-Troy Enterprise Community (TriCity EC) Steering Committee.
According to HUD, this committee "reflected the age, ethnic, economic, and gender
diversity of the designated neighborhoods and representatives were identified through a
community-based nomination process which identified one resident from each of the
participating neighborhoods as a member."82 This description is inaccurate. 83
The committee was comprised solely of representatives of the three cities' private,
nonprofit, and public sectors, and the strategic community planning process was top-
down and elite-driven rather than bottom-up and community-centered. No residents of
the communities that would be targeted by the TriCity EC Steering Committee's strate-
gic community planning process served on the committee, nor was the membership of
the steering committee decided by nomination and election or by governmental ap-
pointment.
The membership of the steering committee was determined by CEG. It extended
invitations to those groups believed to possess the best knowledge about and resources
for developing and submitting a strategic community plan that emphasized regionalism.
These groups then selected representatives to serve on the committee. The result was a
steering committee that represented the interests of the three municipalities: high-level
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staffers from their economic development and planning departments; the Council of
Community Services, an association of the region's not-for-profit social services agen-
cies and a United Way human services planning affiliate; the Capital District Regional
Planning Commission, a regional planning agency; and the Center for Economic
Growth. 84
The TriCity EC Steering Committee charged itself to identify and assess the
strengths and weaknesses of the cities' low-income communities and create a strategic
community plan that would be submitted to HUD by Albany, Schenectady, and Troy.
However, by the time the steering committee convened its first meeting, three months
had elapsed since the application guidelines for the Enterprise Communities program
were issued. It was only three months until the June deadline for HUD's receipt of ap-
plications. To expedite its planning process, the TriCity EC Steering Committee issued
a request for proposals from local economic development consultants and grant writers.
One month later it hired EastWest Planning & Development, a Troy-based firm, to
assist the steering committee in formulating a planning process for the three cities. 85 It
would prepare strategic plan narratives, complete the application forms, conduct a sur-
vey, and organize a set of community forums. 86 Most important, EastWest was con-
tracted to "structure a strategic plan consistent with Enterprise Community prin-
ciples."
87
Its "presence in the process," from EastWest's perspective, "would provide an
opportunity to help the [steering] Committee think critically about the decisions" it
would make concerning its target neighborhoods. 88
Citizen Participation and Resident Input
With the hiring of EastWest Planning & Development, the TriCity EC Steering Com-
mittee had three options concerning the strategic community planning process: (1) with
an impending June deadline, the steering committee could limit resident access to the
process, focusing more of its attention and time on institutional cooperation and the
production of a plan suitable for submission to HUD; (2) influenced by EastWest's
knowledge of the importance of legitimacy to comprehensive community initiatives, the
steering committee could open its planning and decision-making processes to direct
resident participation; or (3) the steering committee could apply a midrange approach,
one that would allow for a modest degree of resident incorporation to occur without
jeopardizing the committee's ability to meet HUD's deadline. The TriCity EC Steering
Committee chose the third option.
According to the application the steering committee submitted to HUD, "Many of
the Steering Committee members believed that resident input into the strategic planning
process could be obtained by gathering key human service agencies together to repre-
sent the needs of their constituencies."89 Over time this belief was muted. The opinions
and attitudes of residents concerning their communities and policy priorities entered the
strategic community planning process through two mechanisms that are widely used to
capture citizens' sense of problems and priorities: public forums and surveys. In theory,
when used as part of public decision-making processes, forums and surveys are useful.90
In practice, however, these instruments have been used by political elites to limit the
direct participation of citizens in public decision making.91
To facilitate citizen participation in the strategic community planning process, the
TriCity EC Steering Committee sponsored "structured community workshops."92 A
workshop was held in each of the three cities one month prior to the date the strategic
community plan was due to HUD.93 These workshops introduced the target communi-
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ties to the Enterprise Communities program and the membership of the TriCity EC
Steering Committee. The intent of these public forums was to elicit community partici-
pation and provide the committee with a clearer understanding of the communities'
problems, resources, and prospects for affecting positive socioeconomic and physical
change, that is, job creation, home ownership, and youth enrichment. The workshop
format consisted of a general introduction by the committee followed by a question-
and-answer period and small-group discussions.
The Enterprise Communities program "promised residents authentic input into the
planning process and the opportunity to share feedback on the proposed strategic plan,
giving them reassurance that their voices mattered."94 According to the steering commit-
tee, its workshops fulfilled this promise by providing a mechanism which ensured that
the strategic community planning process for the TriCity EC "was driven by the needs
and wishes of the residents"; "represented the diversity of the neighborhoods"; demon-
strated "hands-on resident support" in its development and implementation; and vali-
dated "the importance of the problems, resources, and obstacles identified in other stud-
ies by residents of the targeted communities."95
The application submitted to HUD by the TriCity EC Steering Committee does not
state the number of attendees at these community workshops, which, with the exception
of the Schenectady workshop, were held outside its targeted neighborhoods. 96 But few
residents from these neighborhoods attended the workshops. Those who did attend the
workshops were generally "outnumbered three-to-one by the service providers operat-
ing in the target neighborhoods."97 Consequently, most of the "citizen" input came from
neighborhood social service providers, many of whom "were perceived by neighbor-
hood residents as unaccountable, unresponsive, over-professionalized, and inacces-
sible," as well as "partially responsible for abandoning their problems, choosing profes-
sionally or politically expedient courses of action, and setting up unnecessary program-
matic limitations, guidelines, and rules which isolate many residents from needed ser-
vices and support."98
Concurrently with the community workshops, EastWest Planning & Development
conducted a survey among the five neighborhoods that the TriCity EC Steering Com-
mittee would eventually nominate to participate in HUD's Enterprise Communities
program. This "needs assessment" survey was designed to identify the strengths, prob-
lems, and policy priorities of the neighborhoods, which would be used by EastWest in
preparing the strategic community plan.99 Social services and human resource provid-
ers, along with local businesses serving the neighborhoods targeted by the steering
committee, were surveyed by mail. Resident were also surveyed for their opinions
about the problems and prospects for these neighborhoods. According to the steering
committee, nearly two-fifths of the 600 surveys (38 percent or 227) were completed and
returned to EastWest. 100 Of this number, almost three-quarters (71 percent or 162) were
returned by residents of the steering committee's target communities. The resident re-
sponse rate, however, must be put in perspective: fewer than one percent of the five
neighborhoods' 39,072 residents responded to the survey.
Relying on the information culled from the three community workshops and the
survey responses, EastWest prepared the TriCity EC strategic community plan. The
steering committee then submitted the plan, which emphasized three areas of "commu-
nity" concern — employment, youth development, and neighborhood capacity building
— to HUD. At the end of the strategic community planning process, the steering com-
mittee declared in its application to HUD that the degree of participation in the three
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cities "was designed to maximize community involvement and consensus." 10 ' Pointing
to its public forums and survey, the committee avowed that it had met its requirement of
participation.
Reflections on Strategic Community Planning
and Federal Urban Initiatives
Urban scholars acknowledge that introducing common citizens to the process of public
decision making is difficult; making collective decisions "can be time-consuming, co-
optative, and nonproductive" for rank-and-file citizens. 102 Moreover, issues of expertise
and incrementalism, along with citizen interest and ability to articulate alternatives
effectively, influence levels of citizen participation and incorporation into public deci-
sion making. 103 Residents of low-income neighborhoods targeted for redevelopment are
prone to be intimidated by the jargon and complexity of redevelopment and, perhaps
rightfully so, suspicious and impatient with the process of incremental urban
policymaking. 104 Nevertheless, the inclusion of ordinary citizens in the planning and
implementation stages of public policymaking continues to have its academic advo-
cates.
105
Robert Chaskin and Sunil Garg note that there are ethical and practical reasons for
the incorporation of citizens in public decision-making processes that affect their com-
munities. 106 "Ethically, to include citizens in policymaking and program delivery is to
take seriously their rights and responsibilities to have some control over policies that
will have an impact on their lives." 107 Additionally, as theorists of democratic participa-
tion profess, "the experience of participation [in public decision making] in some way
leaves the individual better psychologically equipped to undertake further participation
in the future." 108 Average citizens, whether from poor or nonpoor communities, possess
that which government lacks: "a unique understanding about their own lives, hopes,
aspirations, goals, and preferences and about the manner in which resources should be
provided or services should be designed and delivered." 109 In accordance with this idea,
Jeffrey Henig has found that citizens "represent resources in knowledge, information,
creativity, commitment, and energy" that often prove useful to government decision-
makers and policy success. 110 Therefore, "practically, involving citizens in planning and
implementing practices that affect them promotes better (i.e., more connected, directed,
and appreciated) public policies." 111 Being closest to the problems facing their commu-
nities, citizens can provide perspectives that may go unconsidered by public officials
and their staff in the absence of resident involvement. 112 Yet the structure of citizen
participation in public initiatives that promote urban redevelopment makes "a substan-
tial difference in the degree to which such structures can be seen as connected to, and
acting on behalf of, the interests of the community." 113
The key terms of the federal administration's urban policy orientation and the tenets
underlying its Enterprise Communities program are cooperation and collaboration;
participation and empowerment. 114 Still, the strategic community planning process for
the Albany-Schenectady-Troy Enterprise Community failed to engender cooperation
and collaboration among residents and nonresidents or to promote high levels of partici-
pation from or empowerment in the areas targeted for federal revitalization funds by the
TriCity EC Steering Committee. Surveys and forums proved inferior methods of effec-
tively structuring resident input into the strategic community planning process for the
TriCity Economic Community. "Residents of the [TriCity EC] had participated in the
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community workshops and filled out surveys — but they lacked the capacity to de-
velop a truly 'bottom-up' neighborhood plan." 115 Instead, the EastWest Planning &
Development plan outlined a citizen-driven process in the post-strategic community
planning period. 116 This was a blueprint for neighborhood planning and resident em-
powerment after HUD designated the three cities as a joint Enterprise Community. 117
In short, the strategic community planning process for Albany, Schenectady, and Troy
deferred resident participation and community empowerment to an unknown point in
time. Why?
The rules and regulations for the Enterprise Communities program were not spe-
cific about the role of residents in their city's planning process. Beyond the statement
that community residents were to be included in partnerships with the public and
private sectors, there was no definitive message about the type and quality of resident
participation that should characterize the process. This lack of specificity allowed for
narrow definitions of participation to be used in determining who would be involved
in a city's strategic community planning process and how their connection would be
facilitated. It also impressed upon elites that resident participation was a suggestion,
not a requirement for strategic community planning; resident consultation was ad-
equate to constitute participation.
In the future, policymakers designing federal urban neighborhood redevelopment
initiatives could ensure, through direct language, that citizen participation go beyond
the level of consultation, as expressed through surveys and forums. As Sherry
Arnstein's "ladder of citizen participation" illustrates, unless citizen consultation by
government decision makers is linked to other opportunities for participation, commu-
nities cannot be guaranteed that their resident ideas and concerns will be taken into
account by those guiding the agenda-setting and decision-making processes. 118 More-
over, when government decision makers "restrict the input of citizens' ideas solely to
[consultation], participation remains just a window-dressing ritual." 119
Residents of areas targeted for redevelopment often want to serve their communi-
ties in capacities that go beyond survey responses or public forum statements. 120 If this
is to be believed, policymakers could create opportunities for resident participation by
mandating that urban neighborhood redevelopment programs that receive federal
funds must, during the planning and post-planning periods, include residents of the
affected communities on the committees appointed to formulate neighborhood rede-
velopment plans. Policymakers could also establish formal institutions for citizen
governance of strategic community planning processes. Such neighborhood-based
entities could be charged with arranging, planning, and coordinating strategies for
neighborhood redevelopment. In terms of their membership, these institutions might
be comprised of neighborhood representatives chosen by election or by stratified,
random sampling from communities targeted for public reinvestment and redevelop-
ment. 121 Also, policymakers could require that the proposals formulated by neighbor-
hood-based institutions be submitted to resident comment, perhaps through resident-
community referenda.
Citizen participation comes with costs, the most basic being time and money.
Policymakers should grant enough time and public funds to program administrators to
allow citizen participation to reach a level above consultation. In the Enterprise Com-
munities program, cities were afforded six months to create and submit their strategic
community plans. Because of the time it takes to select and organize committees,
orient members with the requirements and processes of a given program, and raise
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awareness among affected communities, federal urban initiatives relying on strategic
community planning probably should last longer than six months. A period of a year,
for example, would allow planning committees more time not only to organize them-
selves and their communities, but increase the likelihood that their activities, be they
surveys, community forums, or other mechanisms for divining citizen opinions, will
produce better plans in terms of their citizen input and ideas. Not only might more
citizens participate in the planning process, but a greater number of cities might be able
to compete for funding based on their plans, and the quality of the plans submitted to
the program itself increase.
* * *
The Enterprise Communities program is grounded on the belief that citizen participa-
tion and sustained community involvement are essential to the success of federal initia-
tives to influence the revitalization of low-income communities. 122 Therefore, residents
of the neighborhoods targeted by the TriCity EC Steering Committee, with the assis-
tance of public, private, and not-for-profit professionals, should have been at the fore-
front of the strategic community planning process of the TriCity EC. But residents were
not significant and substantive participants in that strategic community planning pro-
cess.
The lack of resident participation in the planning for the Albany-Schenectady-Troy
Enterprise Community was partly the result of the steering committee's misunderstand-
ing that resident participation would matter more in the post-designation period, after
areas of Albany, Schenectady, and Troy were designated as an Enterprise Community
and federal funds were secured. It was also the result of the committee's reliance on
forms of participation that discouraged citizen incorporation and community empower-
ment. Moreover, the opportunity for citizens to take part in the planning was limited by
HUD itself: (1) it failed to define what it meant by resident involvement; (2) it did not
account for slow responses from cities and the weak commitment of elites to empower
residents; and (3) it overlooked the importance of funding cities to promote citizen
participation and neighborhood empowerment as part of strategic community planning.
Another reason was the steering committee's displacement of the Clinton
administration's goal of resident incorporation. By placing its goal of meeting HUD's
application deadline ahead of HUD's goal of resident incorporation, the committee
obstructed the realization of high levels of resident participation and community em-
powerment.
The TriCity EC Steering Committee achieved its goal in December 1994: HUD
designated portions of Albany, Schenectady, and Troy as one of the nation's sixty-five
urban Enterprise Communities. This designation was accompanied by $3 million in
federal funds to be shared equally among the three cities. However, this goal was
achieved in violation of the principles outlined by the Clinton administration's written
record and the Enterprise Communities program's formal requirements.
In the pre-designation period, the TriCity EC Steering Committee lost an opportunity
to empower residents of the low-income neighborhoods of Albany, Schenectady, and
Troy. In the post-designation period, however, new opportunities for participation and
empowerment appeared with the establishment of a second steering committee and the
implementation of the Albany-Schenectady-Troy Enterprise Community's strategic
community plan that emphasizes resident planning and neighborhood empowerment.
"The people in the neighborhoods [comprising the TriCity Enterprise Community],"
according to the president of the Center for Economic Growth, "will be making the
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decisions." 123 Unfortunately, the residents of the low-income neighborhoods in the three
cities have yet to influence the public decision-making process of their Enterprise
Community. 124 Instead, the TriCity EC Steering Committee continues to favor elite
control and expediency. Unfortunately, resident skepticism and reticence concerning the
possibility of collaboration and cooperation between residents and nonresidents of the
targeted communities has deepened. 125 *«?
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